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Footnotes
1. The ethical standards for judges are established by the code of
judicial conduct adopted in each jurisdiction. The basis for the
state and federal codes is the Model Code of Judicial Conduct—
adopted by the American Bar Association in 1972 and revised in
1990 and 2007—although jurisdictions modify the model before
adopting it. Unless otherwise indicated, references to rules in this
article are to the 2007 model code.
2. Over 40 states and the United States Judicial Conference have
judicial-ethics advisory committees to which judges can submit
inquiries regarding the propriety of contemplated future action.
There are links to the websites of the committees at
http://www.ncsc.org/Topics/Judicial-Officers/Ethics/State-
Links.aspx?cat=Ethics%20Advisory%20Committees.
3. The application of the code of judicial conduct requires a deter-
mination of the exact point at which a person becomes a judge,
which varies from state to state and may vary even within a state
depending on the selection process. In some states, a judge
becomes a judge on taking the oath of office. See, e.g., New York
Advisory Opinion 1998-92; Oklahoma Advisory Opinion 1999-2;
South Carolina Advisory Opinion 5-2006; Texas Advisory Opinion
293 (2007). Other states, however, have created different starting
points. See, e.g., Arizona Advisory Opinion 2000-7 (pursuant to
constitutional provision, an elected judge becomes a judge on
“the first Monday in January next succeeding their election,” and,
by statute, an appointed judge becomes a judge on the effective
date of the appointment,” that is, when the commission of office
is signed).
After being elected or appointed to the bench, a buddingjudge should immediately sit down and read the codeof judicial conduct for her jurisdiction.1 That review
will alert the future judge to the ethical principles that will
govern her time on the bench and begin a smooth, conflict-free
transition from advocate to impartial arbiter. 
Outlining the advice judicial-ethics committees have given
about making that transition, this article highlights the provi-
sions in the code of judicial conduct that will have the most
immediate implications for a nascent judge even before taking
the bench.2 It begins by listing the inquiries a soon-to-be judge
should make about charitable, business, and political activities
to evaluate what changes are necessary to conform to the judi-
cial-ethics rules. It also considers whether a new judge may
accept gifts, including receptions, that are offered to mark the
new position. Finally, the article discusses winding up a law
practice, including duties to clients and payments for prior
legal work.3
OFF THE BENCH
Rule 1.2 provides: “A judge shall act at all times in a man-
ner that promotes public confidence in the independence,
integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary, and avoid impropri-
ety and the appearance of impropriety” (emphasis added).
Thus, the code of judicial conduct applies to all of a judge’s
activities, both judicial and personal and both on and off the
bench. In general, as described by Rule 3.1, a judge must not
participate in extrajudicial activities that will interfere with the
proper performance of judicial duties, lead to frequent dis-
qualification, or appear to a reasonable person to undermine
the judge’s independence, integrity, or impartiality.
COMMUNITY ACTIVITIES
After election or appointment, a nascent judge may be sur-
prised to learn that some civic and charitable activities that
were an asset while a candidate may be prohibited after taking
judicial office. Even laudable community activities may bias a
judge in favor of particular parties, causes, or issues, encour-
age individuals to curry the judge’s favor, pressure others to
comply with the judge’s requests, or exploit the judicial office
for the benefit of private organizations—or at least create the
appearance of doing so. There is no exception in the model
code that allows a new judge to continue prohibited involve-
ment in civic and charitable activities after taking the bench.
See Arkansas Advisory Opinion 1996-10 (a new judge may not
serve the rest of her term on the parks and tourism commis-
sion); Florida Advisory Opinion 2006-28 (a newly elected judge
should resign before taking office from any organizations in
which his participation is inappropriate); Texas Advisory Opin-
ion 188 (1996) (a new judge may not attend the two meetings
remaining in her term as a state representative on a national
governmental association). But see Canon 7C, Michigan Code of
Judicial Conduct (giving a newly elected judge until June 30th
and a newly appointed judge six months to resign from orga-
nizations and activities).
Therefore, in the interim between being chosen and taking
the bench, a new judge should ask the following questions and
take any steps necessary to be in compliance with the new
standards when she takes office:
• Am I a member of a governmental commission that does
not concern the law, the legal system, or the administration
of justice (Rule 3.4)?
• Am I a member of an organization that practices invidious
discrimination on the basis of race, sex, gender, religion,
national origin, ethnicity, or sexual orientation (Rule
3.6A)?
• Am I an officer of an organization or entity that is engaged
in proceedings that would ordinarily come before me (Rule
3.7A(6)(a))?
• Am I an officer of an organization or entity that will fre-
quently be engaged in adversary proceedings in the court
on which I serve or in any court subject to the appellate
jurisdiction of my court (Rule 3.7A(6)(b))?
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If a future judge has in the past participated in fundraising
for charitable organizations, she should review the code to see
if she can continue those activities and inform the organiza-
tions about any new restrictions to prevent inadvertent viola-
tions of the code. Under Rule 3.7A, a judge cannot:
• solicit charitable contributions except from members of the
judge’s family or judges over whom she does not exercise
supervisory or appellate authority;
• solicit memberships except in an organization that is con-
cerned with the law, the legal system, or the administration
of justice; or
• be honored at, be featured on the program of, or permit her
title to be used in connection with a fundraising event
unless the event concerns the law, the legal system, or the
administration of justice.
BUSINESS AND FINANCIAL ACTIVITIES
“Judges are generally permitted to engage in financial activ-
ities, including managing real estate and other investments for
themselves or for members of their families,” but participation
“is subject to the requirements of this Code.” Comment 3, Rule
3.11. Rule 3.11B, for example, will require a judge-select “to
resign as an officer, director, manager, general partner, advisor,
or employee of any business entity” unless the business is
“closely held by the judge or members of the judge’s family” or
“primarily engaged in investment of the financial resources of
the judge or members of the judge’s family.” 
Further, a judge-select must examine her financial, busi-
ness, or remunerative activities and withdraw from any that
will (Rule 3.11C):
• interfere with the proper performance of judicial duties;
• lead to frequent disqualification;
• involve the judge in frequent transactions or continuing
business relationships with lawyers or other persons likely
to come before the court on which the judge serves; or
• violate other provisions of the code.
A judge must divest financial interests that violate the code “as
soon as practicable without serious financial detriment” (Com-
ment 2, rule 3.11) but “in no event longer than one year”
(Application § VI).
Finally, to ensure compliance with the disqualification pro-
visions in the code, a new judge must begin:
• to keep informed about her personal and fiduciary eco-
nomic interests (Rule 2.11B);
• to make a reasonable effort to keep informed about the per-
sonal economic interests of her spouse or domestic partner
and minor children residing in her household (Rule 2.11B);
and 
• to conduct her business or financial affairs in a way that
avoids frequent disqualification (Rule 3.1B).
FIDUCIARY POSITIONS
To comply with Rule 3.8A, a new judge has to withdraw
from any “fiduciary position, such as executor, administrator,
trustee, guardian, attorney in fact, or other personal representa-
tive, except for the estate, trust, or person of a member of the
judge’s family . . . .” (“Member of the judge’s family” is defined
as “a spouse, domestic partner, child, grandchild, parent, grand-
parent, or other relative or person
with whom the judge maintains a
close familial relationship.”) Even
if the fiduciary position is for a
member of the judge’s family, a
judge must withdraw:
• if serving as a fiduciary will
interfere with the proper per-
formance of judicial duties
(Rule 3.8A);
• if the judge as fiduciary will
likely be engaged in proceed-
ings that would ordinarily
come before her (Rule 3.8B);
• if the estate, trust, or ward is
or becomes involved in adver-
sary proceedings in the court on which the judge serves or
one under its appellate jurisdiction (Rule 3.8B); or
• if serving as a fiduciary might require frequent disqualifica-
tion (Comment 1, Rule 3.8).
A new judge must resign from an inappropriate fiduciary
position “as soon as reasonably practicable, but in no event
later than [one year] after becoming a judge.” Rule 3.8D. The
South Carolina committee advised that the rule does not autho-
rize a new judge to remain a fiduciary for a year but only for the
time necessary to avoid serious adverse consequences to the
beneficiary, which can, in no event, be longer than one year.
South Carolina Advisory Opinion 21-2000. See Connecticut Emer-
gency Staff Advisory Opinion 2014-21 (a nominee for judicial
office may be sworn into office while he is still serving as the
conservator of a person or estate in pending probate matters);
Massachusetts Advisory Opinion 2008-3 (a new judge should
promptly take steps to remove herself as a trustee of a trust that
is involved in litigation); New York Advisory Opinion 2010-169
(a new judge may complete the tasks necessary to terminate
conservatorships he held before taking the bench but should do
so expeditiously and, in any event, within a year); New York
Advisory Opinion 2010-47 (a newly appointed judge may submit
an application to be discharged from her duties as guardian for
an incapacitated person and prepare a final accounting in a
court proceeding); New York Advisory Opinion 2009-103 (a new
judge may complete fiduciary appointments made before the
effective date of his appointment and receive compensation but
should complete the work within one year, if possible); New
York Advisory Opinion 2002-37 (a new judge may not accept an
appointment to serve as a fiduciary for compensation but may
continue to serve in such capacity pursuant to an appointment
made before assuming the bench); New York Advisory Opinion
1995-39 (a recently elected judge who had been the conserva-
tor for an incompetent may, as a matter of necessity, continue to
perform essential services but must move promptly for the
appointment of a substitute); Pennsylvania Informal Advisory
Opinion 5/29/2012 (a new judge may not serve as executor of
wills that he prepared while practicing law and should instruct
his former law firm to inform the clients to replace him as fidu-
ciary); West Virginia Advisory Opinion (March 21, 2011) (a new
judge may continue to serve as executor of an estate that will be
wrapped up in a couple of months).
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POLITICAL ACTIVITIES 
The restrictions on political
activity by judges vary consid-
erably from state to state, may
vary within a state depending
on whether the judicial position
is an appointed one or an
elected one, and may even vary
from time to time depending on whether a judge is currently a
candidate for re-election. A new judge should carefully exam-
ine the specific provisions of her state’s code to see what rules
to follow.
Under Rule 4 of the model code, a judge shall not: 
• act as a leader in, or hold an office in, a political organiza-
tion (Rule 4.1A(1));
• make speeches on behalf of a political organization (Rule
4.1A(2));
• publicly endorse or oppose a candidate for any public office
(Rule 4.1A(3));
• solicit funds for, pay an assessment to, or make a contribu-
tion to a political organization or a candidate (Rule
4.1A(4));
• attend or purchase tickets for events sponsored by a politi-
cal organization or a candidate (Rule 4.1A(5)); or
• become a candidate for a non-judicial elective office (Rule
4.5A).
The restrictions apply immediately to new judges. See Ari-
zona Advisory Opinion 1993-4 (an elected tribal official may not
serve the balance of her term after appointment as a justice of
the peace); Illinois Advisory Opinion 1999-2 (a newly appointed
judge may not continue to serve as an elected member of a
public school board). Furthermore, some advisory opinions
suggest that an individual who has been elected or appointed
to a judgeship but not yet sworn into office is immediately
bound by the same restrictions on political activity that will
govern her conduct after taking office. South Carolina Advisory
Opinion 23-1994. See also Florida Advisory Opinion 2000-16 (a
judge-elect may not actively participate in a non-judicial cam-
paign before being sworn into office); New York Advisory Opin-
ion 1998-142 (a judge-elect who is vacating a seat in the local
legislature should not engage in political activities in support
of a candidate in the special election for the seat).
GIFTS AND RECEPTIONS FOR NEW JUDGES
A new judge will frequently be offered and can generally
accept gifts from former law partners, close friends, colleagues,
or bar associations to mark her investiture. A gift may necessi-
tate the judge’s recusal from matters involving the donor, but,
in many instances, the donor is likely to be someone whose
appearance in a case would necessitate the judge’s recusal even
without the gift, at least for some period, or a group where
recusal may not be required for individual donors if each indi-
vidual contribution is relatively small. U.S. Advisory Opinion 98
(2009).
Advisory committees have allowed a new judge to accept:
• a gavel or judicial robe from members of her family (New
York Advisory Opinion 2012-177);
The restrictions
on political 
activity . . . apply
immediately to
new judges.
• a robe from a bar association to which the judge belongs
(Arkansas Advisory Opinion 2000-10);
• a clock from a bar association (U.S. Advisory Opinion 98
(2009));
• a gavel from the state’s attorney, who is a former employer
(Florida Advisory Opinion 1976-22);
• gift certificates from her former law firm (Pennsylvania
Informal Advisory Opinion 2/28/2012);
• a judicial robe from former law partners (U.S. Advisory
Opinion 98 (2009));
• a chair from former state judicial colleagues (U.S. Advisory
Opinion 98 (2009)); and 
• a gavel and $500 from a former client (U.S. Advisory Opin-
ion 98 (2009)).
The Connecticut advisory committee stated that a judge may
accept a gift from her former state government office at a din-
ner celebrating her appointment, gifts given at a gathering of
family and church members in honor of her appointment, or a
gift from an attorney who had been opposing counsel in cases
before her appointment and who is likely to appear before her
if the nature or value of the gift is not so great that a reason-
able person would believe that the gift would undermine the
judge’s independence, integrity, or impartiality. Connecticut
Informal Advisory Opinion 2013-10; Connecticut Informal Advi-
sory Opinion 2013-9; Connecticut Advisory Opinion 2013-22. But
see Maryland Advisory Opinion 2003-1 (a master should not
accept a $50 gift certificate from an attorney to whom the mas-
ter referred numerous cases when closing his practice if the
attorney might appear before the master); New Jersey Advisory
Opinion 4-2002 (a newly confirmed judge may not accept from
his former law firm a trip worth approximately $5,000).
Further, a new judge may allow her former law firm to
sponsor and pay the expenses for a reception following her
investiture. Florida Advisory Opinion 1999-3; Illinois Advisory
Opinion 2001-11; Minnesota Summary of Advisory Opinions, at
20 (1995); U.S. Advisory Opinion 98 (2009). See also Washing-
ton Advisory Opinion 1995-5 (a new judge should report the
expense of a reception hosted by her former firm if the value
exceeds the limit for disclosure). The Illinois committee cau-
tioned that a judge may be feted at a post-investiture party
sponsored by her former law firm only if the party is not
intended to advance the interests or status of the firm. Illinois
Advisory Opinion 2001-11. The committee also warned the
judge to exercise “selected control” over the magnitude or
extravagance of the celebration and the number and nature of
those invited.
Other groups may also sponsor a reception for a new judge.
Florida Advisory Opinion 1999-3 (attorneys in a new judge’s
community); South Carolina Advisory Opinion 2003-16 (the
chamber of commerce, local businesses, and area attorneys);
U.S. Advisory Opinion 98 (2009) (a former corporate employer,
a business client, a colleague, or a bar association). However,
the advisory committee for federal judges warned that a new
judge may not accept either a gift or a reception from a politi-
cal organization; a for-profit company that has no pre-existing
or long-standing relationship with the judge; or an organiza-
tion that is publicly identified with controversial legal, social,
or political positions or that regularly engages in adversary
olina Code of Judicial Conduct (“[I]t shall be permissible for a
newly installed judge to facilitate or assist in the transfer of his
prior duties as legal counsel but he may not be compensated
therefore”); Rule 3.10 and comment 2, Tennessee Code of Judicial
Conduct (“A newly elected or appointed judge can practice law
only in an effort to wind up his or her practice, ceasing to practice
as soon as reasonably possible and in no event longer than 180
days after assuming office”; “no new matters may be accepted”).
WINDING UP A LAW 
PRACTICE
Rule 3.10 prohibits a full-time
judge from practicing law. There-
fore, attorneys must immediately
begin to wind up their legal prac-
tices after learning they will
become judges. For those in pri-
vate practice, the winding up has
two facets: terminating the repre-
sentation of clients and terminat-
ing the relationships and finan-
cial arrangements that constitute
the business of a legal practice.
Representation of Clients
After a judge takes office, there is no exception to the prohi-
bition on practicing law that allows the new judge to complete
pending matters for clients.4 Arizona Advisory Opinion 2000-7;
Oklahoma Advisory Opinion 1999-2. The New York committee
stated that, although a confirmed appointee may continue to
practice law until taking the oath of office, he should keep in
mind “the risk attendant upon the failure to do so within the
prescribed period.” New York Advisory Opinion 1998-92. When
the oath has been taken and filed, the committee emphasized,
“the appointee has become a judge and may no longer practice
law. At that point there can be no further ‘closing out’ to be
done that requires the practice of law.” See also South Carolina
Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 4G (the prohibition on practic-
ing law “becomes effective immediately upon taking the oath of
office and applies to any case in the judge’s former practice that
was not completed when judicial duties were assumed”). 
Thus, judicial-ethics committees have advised:
• A new judge may not appear in a federal district court in
another state to represent a defendant in a sentencing hear-
ing shortly after he takes office. Texas Advisory Opinion 293
(2007).
• A new judge may not represent a client in a mediation even
if liability is not contested and the only remaining issue is
the amount necessary to settle the case. Texas Advisory
Opinion 293 (2007).
• A new judge may not present the oral argument before an
appellate court in a case he tried even if his client wants him
to and opposing counsel does not object. Florida Advisory
Opinion 1977-2.
• A new judge who briefed points raised in an appeal while
an attorney may not be listed as an author on the brief. New
York Advisory Opinion 2013-8.
4. A few states have provisions that create a limited exception to the
rule. See Mississippi Code, § 9-1-25 (allowing a chancellor or cir-
cuit judge or a judge of the court of appeals to practice in any
court for six months “so far as to enable them to bring to a con-
clusion cases actually pending when they were appointed or
elected in which such chancellor or judge was then employed”
and allowing a supreme court justice to appear “in the courts of
the United States in any case in which he was engaged when he
was appointed or elected judge); Compliance section, North Car-
proceedings in the federal courts. U.S. Advisory Opinion 98
(2009). See New Jersey Advisory Opinion 3-2001 (a new judge
may not accept a check from the county bar association toward
the cost of a swearing-in reception).
PRACTICE IN THE INTERIM
A lawyer may continue to actively practice law during any
period after she is elected or appointed but before she takes
judicial office. As the Georgia committee explained, “it would
be unfair and unrealistic to require an active trial lawyer to
immediately withdraw as counsel in pending cases simply
because he or she has been elected to serve as a judge for a
term to begin some several months after the election.” Georgia
Advisory Opinion 217 (1996). Similarly, the Florida advisory
committee concluded that the risk of a judge-elect misusing
judicial prestige while practicing law was outweighed by “the
important consideration of allowing a lawyer to effectively and
expeditiously conclude those legal matters that have been
entrusted to the lawyer who has recently been elected to the
bench.” Florida Advisory Opinion 2000-39.
In the interim, a newly chosen judge may appear as trial
counsel (Georgia Advisory Opinion 217 (1996); Pennsylvania
Informal Advisory Opinion 7/2/04); practice before all courts,
including the court to which he has been chosen (Florida Advi-
sory Opinion 1988-29); handle both criminal and civil cases
(Florida Advisory Opinion 1988-29); appear in jury and non-
jury trials (Florida Advisory Opinion 1988-29); and be compen-
sated according to a partnership or employment agreement
(Arkansas Advisory Opinion 1996-9).
Several committees have suggested that, to avoid future dis-
qualification issues, prosecutors should consider changing
their duties when practicing after being chosen as a judge but
before taking office. For example, the Florida committee
approved a proposal by a circuit-judge-elect who was a chief
assistant state attorney to appear only in misdemeanor cases or
in felony cases in another geographic area of the circuit and to
immediately relinquish administrative or supervisory control
over felony attorneys who appear in the court in which she
will sit as a judge, although the committee stated those mea-
sures were not required. Florida Advisory Opinion 1984-21. See
also Arkansas Advisory Opinion 1996-5 (a deputy prosecuting
attorney who is running unopposed for a judicial seat may
continue to prosecute cases in the same district until she takes
office but should keep in mind future disqualification issues).
The Kentucky committee even suggested that a judge-elect
should resign as an assistant county attorney to minimize the
problems of disqualification. Kentucky Advisory Opinion JE-32
(1981).












5. See also In re Ramich, Determination (New York State Commission
on Judicial Conduct, December 27, 2002) (http://www.cjc.ny.gov/
Determinations/R/Ramich.Thomas.E.2002.12.27.DET.pdf) (cen-
sure for, in addition to other misconduct, corresponding with
attorneys in connection with the pay-off of a debt owed to the suc-
cessor in interest to a client for whom the judge, as an attorney,
had obtained a judgment, and signing a satisfaction of judgment
as an attorney for the judgment creditor); In re Slusher, Stipulation
and Agreement (Washington State Commission on Judicial Con-
duct, April 3, 1992) (http://www.cjc.state.wa.us/Case%20Mat
erial/1992/1205%20Stipulation.pdf) (public admonishment for
attempting to secure funds for a former client by communicating
with the attorney for the other party).
6. See also In re Jefferson, 753 So. 2d 181 (La. 2000) (removal of
judge who, in addition to other misconduct, participated in a case
as counsel for four years after becoming a judge, including writ-
ing a letter to opposing counsel seeking to close the file and sign-
ing a motion to dismiss that was filed during his second term of
office); In re Ryman, 232 N.W.2d 178 (Mich. 1975) (removal for,
in addition to other misconduct, maintaining an office and fur-
nishing legal services to former clients after assuming office);
Commission on Judicial Performance v. Osborne, 876 So. 2d 324
(Miss. 2004) (public reprimand for filing six complaints and two
bankruptcy petitions in the six months after he became a judge);
In re Intemann, Determination (New York State Commission on
Judicial Conduct, October 25, 1988) (http://www.cjc.ny.gov/
Determinations/I/Intemann.William.H.Jr.1988.10.25.DET.pdf)
(removal for, in addition to other misconduct, continuing to pro-
vide legal services for three estates); Disciplinary Counsel v. Ben-
der, 11 N.E.3d 1168 (Ohio 2014) (two-year stayed suspension for
(1) during his transition from private practice to the bench,
neglecting a client’s personal-injury case and continuing to prac-
tice law after becoming a judge and (2) failing to timely withdraw
his earned fees from his client trust account, commingling per-
sonal and client funds).
• A new judge may not assist a
former client seeking satis-
faction of a judgment
entered before he took the
bench. Florida Advisory
Opinion 2009-9.5
Of course, the practice of
law “is not limited to appear-
ing in court, or advising and
assisting in the conduct of liti-
gation, but embraces all advice
to clients and all actions taken
for them in matters connected
with the law,” including “the
preparation of pleadings, and
other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, con-
veyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds,
and the giving of legal advice to clients.” Florida Advisory Opin-
ion 2005-19. Thus, those types of acts are also prohibited for a
new judge. See Florida Advisory Opinion 2006-1 (a recently
appointed judge may not sign a title-insurance policy after tak-
ing the bench even if the documents were recorded and the
policy took effect before the judge took office); Florida Advi-
sory Opinion 1983-3 (a new judge may not complete a real-
estate transaction by attending the closing or complete the pro-
bating of two estates); New York Advisory Opinion 1989-38 (a
new judge may not complete unfinished legal services for an
estate even if no court appearances are necessary); West Vir-
ginia Advisory Opinion (December 19, 2012) (a new judge may
not prepare a legal document related to his prior employment). 
There is no exception that would allow a new judge to per-
form “ministerial” acts for clients. The New York Court of
Appeals removed a judge for continuing to perform legal or
business services for clients, continuing to act as a fiduciary in
several estates, and maintaining a business and financial rela-
tionship with his former law firm, which had an active practice
before his court. In the Matter of Moynihan, 604 N.E.2d 136
(N.Y. 1992). The judge had contended that the tasks he per-
formed—for example, filling out tax returns, banking activities,
expediting stock transfers, and administering an estate—were
purely “ministerial” acts that did not conflict with his judicial
responsibilities. The Court held that, to the extent the acts were
ministerial, there was no justification for his failure to turn
them over to another attorney. The judge had also claimed that
his actions were necessary to wind up a busy practice with
long-standing responsibilities to clients. However, the Court
found that the two years the judge had continued to provide
services after assuming the bench was “an inexcusably long
period,” noting that the work involved matters that came before
the judge’s own court, albeit before different judges. 
Rejecting a judge’s argument that he had interpreted the
code in good faith to allow him to finish his law practice by
performing clerical activities after he took office, the Arkansas
Supreme Court concluded that the work the judge had per-
formed was more than ministerial or clerical and constituted
the active practice of law. Judicial Discipline and Disability Com-
mission v. Thompson, 16 S.W.3d 212 (Ark. 2000). In one case,
the judge had met with clients in his chambers to discuss a set-
tlement, accompanied the clients when they negotiated the set-
tlement check, faxed a letter to co-counsel confirming their fee
arrangement, and sent co-counsel a cashier’s check with a let-
ter, written on his judicial stationery, directing her to approve
the order of dismissal and giving her directions on closing the
case. In a second case, the judge had participated in several
depositions and exchanged legal correspondence and docu-
ments with opposing counsel and the court clerk regarding set-
tlement.6
Duties to Clients
Given the strictness of the rule against judges practicing
law, “a newly elected judge should devote substantial attention
to winding up the law practice, with due regard for the rights
and expectations of existing clients.” Florida Advisory Opinion
2000-39. For example, before assuming judicial office, an
attorney must withdraw from client representation and cease
accepting new clients (New York Advisory Opinion 2005-
130(A)) and arrange for new counsel to handle any outstand-
ing motions scheduled to be heard after she assumes judicial
office (New York Advisory Opinion 2004-137).











law practice . . . .”
Except for the addition of the deadline imposed by taking
office, the ethical responsibilities owed to clients when an attor-
ney leaves the practice of law to become a judge are no differ-
ent than those owed when an attorney ends representation for
any other reason, and an attorney should consult state resources
on that issue immediately after appointment or election. Rule
1.16(d) of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct provides
that “[u]pon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take
steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client’s
interests . . . .” The rule specifically requires:
• giving reasonable notice to the client;
• allowing time for employment of other counsel;
• surrendering papers and property to which the client is enti-
tled; and 
• refunding any advance payment of fees or expenses that has
not been earned or incurred.
Judicial-ethics committees have applied those rules to attorneys
newly chosen to become judges. See Arizona Advisory Opinion
2000-7; Illinois Advisory Opinion 1994-12; Michigan Advisory
Opinion J-2 (1989).
Thus, a budding judge should discuss with her clients the
options for obtaining counsel for pending matters, assist the
client in locating counsel with the required expertise, and dis-
cuss pending cases with the client or the client’s new attorney.
Alabama Advisory Opinion 13-920; Arizona Advisory Opinion
2000-7. See Kansas Advisory Opinion JE-11 (1984) (an attorney
who is becoming a judge may not suggest or recommend the
services of any particular lawyer). A file can be transferred to
another attorney only after full disclosure to the client and the
client’s consent, not only to the transfer but to any fee arrange-
ment between the transferor and transferee attorneys. Michigan
Advisory Opinion JI-89 (1994); New Mexico Advisory Opinion
2012-14; South Carolina Advisory Opinion 21-1998; Texas Advi-
sory Opinion 293 (2007).
Before taking the bench, a judge-elect should make clear to
her clients that she can no longer represent them in any way
after being sworn in, including providing advice or consulting
about continuing cases and prior work. South Carolina Advisory
Opinion 21-1998. Further, any necessary “discussion of pending
cases with new counsel that would constitute the practice of
law should take place during the process of closing the law
practice, not after the judge takes office.” Florida Advisory Opin-
ion 2005-19. The New York committee suggested that “the safe
and ethical practice would be for the judge-elect to concentrate,
during the closing of the law practice, on providing subsequent
counsel with everything necessary to avoid the need for later
discussions.” New York Advisory Opinion 2000-77. 
However, advisory opinions do distinguish between giving
legal advice, which is prohibited after taking the bench, and
providing factual information, which may be permitted. For
example, the Connecticut committee advised that a new judge
may answer a successor attorney’s questions about “factual mat-
ters not readily apparent from the file” or “the nature and loca-
tion of documents and other historical information” as long as
she does not “answer questions involving legal advice or litiga-
tion strategy.” Connecticut Informal Advisory Opinion 2013-12.
See also Alabama Advisory Opinion 13-920.1; Nevada Advisory
Opinion JE13-001.
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The exception has been
applied to allow judges to file
affidavits or unsworn state-
ments or even testify about for-
mer representation. For exam-
ple, the Massachusetts commit-
tee advised that a judge may tes-
tify pursuant to a subpoena in a
civil suit about estate-planning
documents he prepared for
clients after obtaining the for-
mer client’s waiver of the attor-
ney-client privilege (or obtain-
ing legal advice from his own
counsel about whether the priv-
ilege should be asserted) and after ascertaining whether the
information may be obtained from another source. Massachu-
setts Advisory Opinion 2009-5. However, the committee
reminded the judge not to give an opinion, strategize with her
former client’s current counsel, or take steps to advance the
client’s cause. See also Connecticut Informal Opinion 2013-34;
New York Advisory Opinion 1996-128; New York Advisory Opin-
ion 2007-32; New York Advisory Opinion 2004-67; New York
Advisory Opinion 1991-137. But see Florida Advisory Opinion
1979-12 (a judge may not, absent a subpoena, testify before a
state administrative agency regarding the history and purpose
of a statute she drafted while general counsel for a state
administrative agency); Kansas Advisory Opinion 161 (2008)
(a judge should not provide an affidavit about his recollection
of events related to a journal entry in a civil case in which he
represented the plaintiff).
The issue of post-bench consultation arises frequently in
criminal cases given the sometimes lengthy post-conviction
relief proceedings. For example, the Nevada advisory commit-
tee stated that a judge could provide the current prosecutor a
written verbatim transcription of her otherwise illegible notes
about a case prepared when she was prosecutor as long as she
did not discuss the notes, transcription, or any other matter or
otherwise help the current prosecutor prepare for a new sen-
tencing hearing. Nevada Advisory Opinion JE1998-3. See also
Florida Advisory Opinion 2006-12; Illinois Advisory Opinion
1994-19; New York Advisory Opinion 2011-96; New York Advi-
sory Opinion 1996-128; New York Advisory Opinion 1995-20;
Pennsylvania Informal Advisory Opinion 4/20/2009.
Similar advice has been given to former defense counsel. For
example, the Massachusetts committee gave a judge permission
when subpoenaed to give factual testimony before the parole
board about a former client’s decision to forgo a plea offer made
by the prosecutor but advised the judge to ask counsel whether
her testimony was truly necessary or whether information
might be obtained from some other source. Massachusetts Advi-
sory Opinion 2006-2. See also Massachusetts Advisory Opinion
2001-2; New York Advisory Opinion 2013-53; New York Advisory
Opinion 2007-153; New York Advisory Opinion 1995-116. But see
Florida Advisory Opinion 1999-4 (a judge may not execute an
affidavit explaining why he took certain steps while represent-
ing a former client and commenting on the former client’s good
character to be submitted to a prosecutor to resolve criminal
charges of workers’-compensation fraud).










PAYMENTS AFTER TAKING 
THE BENCH
Judicial-ethics committees have
advised that a judge may, after tak-
ing the bench, accept various
types of payments related to her
pre-bench legal practice. A revised
code of judicial conduct adopted
in 2015 in Maine expressly allows
that practice:
A judge, after leaving prac-
tice and becoming a judge,
may continue to receive fees
and payments entirely earned 
while engaged in the practice of law before becoming a
judge, including fees for services rendered, payments from
structured settlements and judgments to be paid over
time, deferred compensation plans, retirement plans, pay-
ments to the judge for sale of his or her practice, pay-
ments to the judge for his or her equity upon leaving a
firm, and any other fees or payments entirely earned while
engaged in the practice of law before becoming a judge.
Rule 3.11E. The majority rule is that a judge is disqualified
from any matters involving a firm or attorney while the judge
is receiving payments from the firm or attorney. See Cynthia
Gray, “Disqualification Issues Faced by New Judges,” Judicial
Conduct Reporter (Fall 2010).
Addressing a common situation, the advisory committee for
federal judges stated that a new judge may receive payments
from her former firm after taking judicial office pursuant to an
agreement providing for payment of an agreed amount repre-
senting a departing partner’s interest in the firm. U.S. Advisory
Opinion 24 (2009). Other committees have approved receipt of
similar payments. See Alabama Advisory Opinion 1986-248 (a
judge may share law-partnership profits earned but not paid
before his assuming the bench for the approximately one year
it would take to complete all financial settlements); Alabama
Advisory Opinion 1989-351 (a judge’s former partner may exe-
cute a promissory note evidencing deferred compensation to
come due in almost two years); Arkansas Advisory Opinion
1996-9 (a new judge may accept a lump sum or installment
payments from the law firm he left); Connecticut Informal Advi-
sory Opinion 2008-19 (a new judicial officer may accept a sin-
gle payment for work done on a contingency-fee lawsuit); Con-
necticut Informal Advisory Opinion 2008-19A (a judge may
accept payment from a former law firm for a case initiated on
behalf of a client that the judge had brought to the firm as a
“rainmaker” in lieu of any payments for his interest in the
practice when the sole remaining case is settled approximately
four years later than the firm and judicial official had contem-
plated); Delaware Advisory Opinion 2004-2 (a new judge may
receive a percentage interest in receivables collected for ser-
vices performed before his departure for a year, and, after a
year, a lump sum representing the judge’s interest in a present-
value calculation of accounts receivable, anticipated proceeds
from contingent-fees cases, and payments under the firm’s
retirement plan); Florida Advisory Opinion 1976-1 (a new judge
may accept a fixed amount for his interest in his former law
firm and the proportionate share of the fees earned before his
elevation to the bench); Florida Advisory Opinion 1974-4 (a
new judge may receive annual installment payments for his
interest in a firm computed on a predetermined formula pur-
suant to a standard contract for all shareholders); Florida Advi-
sory Opinion 2003-2 (a new judge may receive periodic pay-
ments for his interest in his former firm or a note executed for
the balance); Georgia Advisory Opinion 12 (1977) (a new judge
may receive his pro rata share of fees earned but not collected
as of the time of his retirement from a firm); Louisiana Advisory
Opinion (July 8, 2010) (a new judge may receive installment
payments over 18 months from his former law firm represent-
ing approximately 10% of the fees the firm received from his
clients during his tenure with the firm); Maine Advisory Opin-
ion 2005-2 (a new judge may over time be paid the amount of
money due from his former law partners); Massachusetts Advi-
sory Opinion 2000-1 (a new judge’s former firm may pay him a
fixed amount at a reasonable rate of interest in installments
over 10 years); Minnesota Advisory Opinion 2014-1 (a lump-
sum payment for a judge’s interest in his former law firm is
preferable, but, if immediate liquidation would cause serious
financial detriment, an installment sale is permissible);
Nebraska Advisory Opinion 2007-2 (the remaining shareholders
in a new judge’s former law firm may purchase his interest if he
holds the funds in a blind trust until a note of which he is a co-
maker is expected to be paid off); New York Advisory Opinion
2011-21 (a judge may receive a discretionary year-end bonus as
a former partner from his former firm based only on work he
performed before assuming the bench); Ohio Advisory Opinion
2007-2 (a new judge may receive retirement benefits from his
former law firm pursuant to an agreement only for a reason-
able period to minimize the number of cases in which he will
be disqualified); Pennsylvania Informal Advisory Opinion
10/29/2010 (a judge may receive installments for the agreed-
upon value of his interest in the law practice, including fees
earned before he took the oath of office; the firm may sign a
promissory note for the deferred payments); West Virginia
Advisory Opinion (January 16, 2001) (a new judge may receive
intermittent payments from his former law firm for an
extended period). 
However, the amount to be paid to the judge cannot be
based on work performed or profits earned after the judge’s
departure from the firm. Arkansas Advisory Opinion 1996-9;
Nebraska Advisory Opinion 1989-1; U.S. Advisory Opinion 24
(2009). Some committees require that the amount to be paid
must be fixed before the judge takes office (Florida Advisory
Opinion 1974-4; Maine Advisory Opinion 2005-2; Minnesota
Advisory Opinion 2014-1), although others simply indicate the
amount should be set “if possible” (Nebraska Advisory Opinion
1989-1; U.S. Advisory Opinion 24 (2009)). The duration of the
installments should be short (Minnesota Advisory Opinion
2014-1; Pennsylvania Informal Advisory Opinion 10/29/2010)
and “end at the earliest practicable date, ideally within a few
months” (Arkansas Advisory Opinion 1996-9), although some
committees have approved periods of 18 months (Louisiana
Advisory Opinion (July 8, 2010)), several years (U.S. Advisory
Opinion 24 (2009), and as long as 5 years (West Virginia Advi-
sory Opinion (March 21, 2011)) or even 10 years (Massachu-
setts Advisory Opinion 2000-1).
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For lawyers who leave a solo practice or small firm, judicial-
ethics committees have approved a variety of arrangements
that include payments after the judge takes office. See Florida
Advisory Opinion 2013-1 (a lawyer who has been appointed as
a judge may sell his interest in a law practice and collect pay-
ments over time while sitting as a judge, but payments for
goodwill may not take into account fees earned in pending
matters transferred to the acquiring firm); Florida Advisory
Opinion 1996-26 (a lawyer recently elected to the bench may
transfer his practice to a purchasing attorney for a lump sum if
the practice is valued before the judge assumes the bench in an
arms-length transaction based on the best reasonable estimates
and may take a promissory note for a portion of the lump sum
as long as the future payments remain irrevocably tied to the
value of the practice at the time of the transfer); New York Advi-
sory Opinion 2000-3 (a newly elected judge may receive com-
pensation for the equity value of the judge’s share in a law part-
nership that is dissolving as a result of his election as deter-
mined in accordance with generally accepted accounting prin-
ciples); Pennsylvania Informal Advisory Opinion 12/7/2009 (a
judge-elect may sell his law practice in accordance with the
rules of professional conduct and receive payment after being
sworn in).
Fees
With certain conditions, after taking office, a judge may
receive payment of legal fees for prior work done as an attor-
ney, including hourly fees, flat fees, and contingency fees, from
former clients, former partners, former firms, successor
lawyers, or successor firms. The Ohio committee explained:
Newly elected or appointed judges are not expected or
required to forego compensation for legal services they
provided before assuming judicial office. No rule in either
the Code of Judicial Conduct or the Rules of Professional
Conduct can be construed to require such forfeiture of
legal fees earned prior to taking the bench.
Ohio Advisory Opinion 2007-2. The rule applies to a former solo
practitioner, salaried associate of a firm, or a partner or share-
holder who receives a percentage of the firm’s fees. Kentucky
Advisory Opinion JE-41 (1982). See also Alabama Advisory Opin-
ion 2013-921; Alabama Advisory Opinion 1997-659; Alabama
Advisory Opinion 1981-114; Arkansas Advisory Opinion 1996-9;
Connecticut Informal Advisory Opinion 2008-19; Florida Advisory
Opinion 2009-9; Florida Advisory Opinion 1993-38; Florida Advi-
sory Opinion 1986-7; Florida Advisory Opinion 1981-11; Georgia
Advisory Opinion 12 (1977); Illinois Advisory Opinion 1994-12;
Kansas Advisory Opinion JE-68 (1996); Kentucky Advisory Opin-
ion JE-41 (1982); Maryland Advisory Opinion 2003-1; Maryland
Advisory Opinion Request 1974-6; Massachusetts Advisory Opin-
ion 2008-2; Minnesota Advisory Opinion 2014-1; Missouri Advi-
sory Opinion 62 (1981); New Mexico Advisory Opinion 2012-14;
New York Advisory Opinion 1996-91; Oklahoma Advisory Opin-
ion 2005-2; Pennsylvania Informal Advisory Opinion 2/11a/10;
South Carolina Advisory Opinion 21-1998; West Virginia Advisory
Opinion (December 18, 2000); West Virginia Advisory Opinion
(September 28, 1998).
The Ohio advisory committee noted:
Often the compensation due to the judge will be
straightforward, such as
when the legal services
were provided pursuant
to an hourly fee or flat fee
agreement. In hourly rate
matters, the judge would
be entitled to receive 
the accounts receivable
reflecting the number of
hours billed by the judge
times the agreed upon
hourly rate. In flat fee
matters, the judge would
be entitled to receive the
accounts receivable for
the agreed upon flat fee.
Ohio Advisory Opinion 2007-2. However, it continued, “some-
times, the compensation due to the judge is less clear, such as
in contingent fee matters that are not completed before the
judge assumes judicial office.”
If the contingent fee matter is completed before the judge
is sworn into office, the judge would be entitled to
receive the accounts receivable for the agreed upon con-
tingent fee rate in the fee agreement. But if the contingent
fee matter is not completed before the judge is sworn into
office, there is no clarity as to how the judge is to be com-
pensated. Is the judge entitled to compensation based
upon the agreed upon contingent fee rate or is the judge
entitled to compensation based on quantum meruit? Is
the judge entitled to compensation before the contin-
gency occurs or must the contingency occur?
The committee advised:
The most prudent approach in a contingent fee matter
that is not completed before the judge takes the bench is
for the judge to accept compensation, once the contin-
gency occurs, based upon quantum meruit for services
performed prior to assuming judicial office. In some cir-
cumstances, such as when the contingency fee matter was
nearly completed before taking judicial office, the quan-
tum meruit compensation might equal the agreed upon
percentage rate in the contingency fee contract. In other
circumstances, such as when the contingency fee matter
was undertaken shortly prior to taking the bench and lit-
tle work was performed by the judge on the matter, the
quantum meruit would most certainly not approach the
agreed upon contingent fee. [Citation omitted.]
There is no time limit on a judge’s ability to accept fees. See
Alabama Advisory Opinion 2013-921 (a judge may accept his
share of legal fees for work he performed before taking office
even nine years after becoming a judge); Florida Advisory Opin-
ion 1997-9 (a judge may accept fees based upon work per-
formed from 1988 until she became a judge in 1990 in a per-
sonal-injury case that did not settle until 1997); New York
Advisory Opinion 1995-12 (a judge may accept fees previously
earned that were not payable for one year or longer); Oklahoma
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owed by a former client four
years after going on the bench
and after he had formally for-
given all accounts receivable).
There are several conditions
imposed on a new judge’s
acceptance of fees:
• The amount, the percent-
age, or the method for calculat-
ing her share must be established before the judge takes
office.
• The amount the judge receives must reasonably reflect only
the amount of work she did on the case before assuming the
bench.
• The judge must not receive any part of a fee that was col-
lected in matters that were not pending with the firm at the
time she left or that was generated by clients on matters that
arose afterwards.
• The division of fees between the judge and the lawyer or
firm who completes the work should be reasonable and in
proportion.
• The fee must not be clearly excessive.
• The fees must be proper under the rules of professional
conduct.
• The computation must be based on traditional standards.
• The judge should consider whether the decision to accept
payment affects her disqualification from matters involving
the client, opposing parties, and the law firm or lawyer.
• The fee arrangement must have been fully disclosed to the
client. 
Compare West Virginia Advisory Opinion (December 18, 2000)
(a fee arrangement must be in writing), with Alabama Advisory
Opinion 13-921 (if the arrangement is traditional or standard in
the legal profession and the judge’s former law firm, the lack of
a written agreement does not necessarily prevent the judge
from receiving the compensation due for work performed),
and Connecticut Information Advisory Opinion 2008-19A
(although a pre-existing verbal separation agreement is accept-
able, written agreements are preferable).
Further, a new judge may take steps to collect fees if she
avoids abusing the prestige of office to do so. See Maryland
Advisory Opinion 2003-1 (if a newly appointed master was a
sole practitioner, the master may collect previously earned fees
from former clients); Minnesota Advisory Opinion 2014-1 (a for-
mer solo practitioner may continue to collect accounts receiv-
able for a reasonable period following his appointment as a
judge); New York Advisory Opinion 1995-12 (to collect fees, a
new judge may forward bills to former clients for outstanding
balances due for services rendered before becoming a judge);
West Virginia Advisory Opinion (November 25, 2009) (a judge
may prepare fee petitions for legal work he performed before
taking office in a number of cases). Contra Kentucky Advisory
Opinion JE-32 (1981) (a judge must turn his accounts over to
another lawyer for collection).
Relationship to Firm
“Upon assuming judicial office, a judge is required to sever
all ties with the judge’s former firm.” Michigan Advisory Opinion
JI-89 (1994). As an essential step in that process, a new judge
must ensure that her name is deleted from a former firm’s name.
The name change is required by both the code of judicial con-
duct and the rules of professional responsibility. Rule 1.3 of the
code prohibits a judge from abusing the prestige of office to
advance private interests. Rule 7.5(C) of the Model Rules of Pro-
fessional Responsibility states that the “name of a lawyer holding
a public office shall not be used in the name of a law firm, or in
communications on its behalf, during any substantial period in
which the lawyer is not actively and regularly practicing with
the firm.” See Kentucky Advisory Opinion JE-41 (1982) (a new
judge has a duty to see that his name is removed from a firm
name, and the firm has a “like duty”); Louisiana Advisory Opin-
ion 155 (1999) (a judge may not permit his former law firm to
use his name in the firm name); Michigan Advisory Opinion JI-
89 (1994) (a judge may not allow his name to remain in the
name of his former law firm); New York Advisory Opinion 1989-
136 (before assuming judicial office, a judge must remove his
name from a firm’s masthead). See also Annual Report for Calen-
dar Year 2015, Arizona Commission on Judicial Conduct, at 9
(http://www.azcourts.gov/Portals/137/2015%20CJC%20Annual
%20Report.pdf) (describing a private warning to a justice of the
peace to ensure that his former law firm’s website did not give
the appearance or leave the impression that he still practiced
law with the firm, including, but not limited to, removing his
name from the firm name). Cf. Massachusetts Advisory Opinion
2003-9 (a judge whose former firm has refused his requests to
remove his surname from the firm name may file a complaint
with the board of bar overseers but is not required to do so);
New York Advisory Opinion 2015-19 (a judge who asked his for-
mer law firm in writing to remove his name from the firm’s 
signage, letterhead, and other materials need not take further
action).
Further, a new judge must ensure that her name is not used
in professional notices sent out by her former firm. Michigan
Advisory Opinion JI-89 (1994). See also Florida Advisory Opin-
ion 2006-10 (a new judge may not allow his former firm to
make a congratulatory announcement about his recent
appointment in the Florida Bar News or a letter to the firm’s
clients); Florida Advisory Opinion 1994-45 (a new judge may
not assent to the publication of a congratulatory announce-
ment by the judge’s former law firm or the firm’s mailing of a
congratulatory announcement to its clients); Massachusetts
Advisory Opinion 1990-1 (a judge must notify members of his
former law firm that he objects to the use of his name and title
in a brochure the firm is preparing for distribution to clients
and prospective clients).
Whether a judge may maintain retirement funds in a for-
mer firm’s plan at least for a short period depends on whether
that arrangement would require frequent disqualification and
whether there is an alternative that will not result in a sub-
stantial loss to the new judge. For example, the Connecticut
committee advised that a judge may leave accumulated funds
in a retirement plan set up by her former law firm for a rea-
sonable time but in no event longer than one year after taking
the oath of office and should not hear any cases in which her
former firm is involved. Connecticut Informal Advisory 2015-
13. If she creates a self-directed sub-account for which she
directs all investments and pays all fees and into which the
[A] new judge
may take steps to
collect fees if she
avoids abusing
the prestige of
office to do so.
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7. Cf. Florida Advisory Opinion 2005-8 (after assuming the bench, a
new judge should close a trust account from his practice even
though it is only being used for the distribution of funds when
received, and future disbursements should be made through the
trust account of a third party); Florida Advisory Opinion 2006-1 (a
recently appointed judge is required to change the status of his
professional corporation or dissolve it before taking the bench
even though it will be required to file an income-tax return, issue
W-2 forms, and prepare other documents well after the date he
takes the bench; his former professional association’s operating
account may remain open but should reflect the status of the new
legal entity established before the judge takes the bench); Florida
Advisory Opinion 2006-31 (a new judge and his former law partner
may continue to maintain a partnership account solely to receive
fees due the partnership for work done before his election as long
as the partnership has been formally dissolved, the account is
closed within a reasonable time, and the two former partners per-
form no professional services).
firm makes no further contributions, the committee advised,
the judge may maintain the account for longer than a year but
must disclose to counsel and to parties her participation in the
firm’s plan when members of the former law firm appear. See
also Alabama Advisory Opinion 91-417 (a judge may leave
accumulated funds in the retirement plan set up by his old law
firm if he sets up a sub-account for which he pays the man-
agement fee and into which the firm makes no further contri-
butions on his behalf); Delaware Advisory Opinion 2004-2 (if
the terms of a former firm’s retirement plan permit a new
judge to withdraw assets, he should do so; if the terms do not
permit withdrawal, the issues that could arise out of a judge’s
continued participation in a former firm’s retirement plan will
depend on the nature and terms of the plan); Minnesota Sum-
mary of Advisory Opinions, at 20 (2001) (unless the account
can be transferred to another plan without substantial loss, a
recently appointed judge may maintain a pension and profit-
sharing account with his former law firm for a reasonable
period not to exceed three years); Pennsylvania Informal Advi-
sory Opinion 10/29/2010 (a new judge may not keep his retire-
ment account at his former law firm if lawyers from the for-
mer firm will regularly appear before him, if investment deci-
sions are no longer made by the trustee, but by members of
the former law firm, or if it is not possible for the judge to cre-
ate a sub-account for which he pays the management fees and
into which the firm makes no further contributions; the judge
may maintain the account for a reasonable time to avoid seri-
ous financial detriment).
Several committees have advised that a new judge who was
a solo practitioner or part of a small firm that is breaking up
when she leaves may maintain the existence of the firm after
taking the bench solely to wind up its financial affairs. For
example, the Connecticut committee received an inquiry from
a judicial nominee who was the sole shareholder in a small
firm that would cease to practice law after the nominee was
confirmed because the other attorneys were joining other
firms. Connecticut Informal Advisory Opinion 2014-4. The com-
mittee advised that the former firm could remain in existence
and retain its name (that of the new judicial officer) on a bank
account solely for receiving payments of fees as long as the
firm was not held out to the public as being in existence, there
was a written agreement as to how the funds were to be dis-
tributed, clients were notified that the firm was dissolved but
that payments should continue, and payments were received
only for work done before the judge’s confirmation. See also
Massachusetts Advisory Opinion 2008-2; Minnesota Advisory
Opinion 2014-1; New York Advisory Opinion 2007-5; New York
Advisory Opinion 2005-130(A); South Carolina Advisory Opinion
13-1996; South Carolina Advisory Opinion 8-2003; West Virginia
Advisory Opinion (November 10, 2011).
While winding down, the firm can collect accounts receiv-
able, send periodic bills to former clients, maintain an escrow
account, pay debts, submit corporate-income-tax returns, file
unemployment forms for employees, organize and store finan-
cial records, and retain client records. However, the firm
should be dissolved as soon as practicable (New York Advisory
Opinion 2007-5; New York Advisory Opinion 2005-130(A)) and
remain in existence only until all accounts receivable are col-
lected or until the end of the year, whichever is earlier (South
Carolina Advisory Opinion 13-1996), or within a year after the
judge assumes office, even if some receivables are still out-
standing (Minnesota Advisory Opinion 2014-1). But see Ohio
Advisory Opinion 1995-3 (law-firm partners and a newly
elected judge should not continue their law partnership even
for the sole purpose of collecting accounts receivable).7
CONCLUSION
Attorneys are accustomed to being governed by a code of
ethics, of course, but the rules in the code of judicial conduct
will be new, touch on every part of a new judge’s life, and, in
some respects, require a reversal of practices the attorney has
followed for years. Thus, an immediate, thorough review of the
code may prevent a very public stumble by a new judge and
begin the commitment to judicial independence, integrity, and
impartiality the judge will be eager to maintain throughout a
long career on the bench.
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